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Conspiracy of Near Silence
Violence Against Iraqi Women
Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt
Shortly before the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, the administration of President George W. Bush began paying a great deal of public attention 
to the suffering of Iraqi women under the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. In speeches and meetings with Iraqi women in exile, 
the Bush administration implied that US military action was 
necessary to save women from torture, rape and sexual assault, 
among other kinds of mistreatment and discrimination. Eight 
years later, women in Iraq continue to suffer such violence—if 
anything, more of it—due to the social dislocation, economic 
hardship, ethnic and sectarian tensions, and endemic corrup-
tion that characterize the country today. As the administration 
of President Barack Obama pulls US troops out of Iraq, and 
the Iraq story fades from view in the West, there is a conspiracy 
of near silence about the increasing violence against women, 
from the international level down to the local.
Women Under Attack
Many in the West assume that, because armed conflict has 
lessened, Iraq has become a safe place to live. This impression 
is exaggerated, at best. According to Iraq Body Count, an 
independent website that uses press accounts to track the 
war’s death toll, there were 4,036 civilian fatalities caused by 
US-led forces, paramilitary units or criminal elements in 2010. 
The death rate has gone down from its peak in 2006, when 
by the website’s tally almost 28,000 civilians were killed. Iraq 
Body Count’s numbers are probably conservative, since not 
all such fatalities are reported in the press, but the decline is 
nonetheless significant. The Iraq Body Count figures tell an 
even more partial story about violence visited upon women, 
however. First, women are less likely then men to die in the 
armed attacks that draw media notice and so their deaths are 
less likely to be counted. They are exposed to physical, sexual, 
psychological and verbal abuse at the hands of occupation 
soldiers, Iraqi security forces, Iraqi political parties and their 
militias, insurgents and criminal gangs, but also strangers 
on the street and family members in the home. The latter 
types of attacks, in particular, are associated with heightened 
socio-economic insecurity. Second, women are particularly 
vulnerable to this wider range of violence, with specific 
consequences for their ability to participate in public life.
Violence against women appears to be increasing, though 
it is difficult to be sure. Though Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International and MADRE have published field 
reports, this violence remains one of the least studied aspects 
of post-invasion Iraq.1 It is under-reported as well, due to 
the stigma, the fear of retribution and poor mechanisms of 
official documentation. Yet there are several indicators of a rise. 
According to a women’s rights activist in a provincial town 
interviewed by phone in February 2009, “The general violence 
has decreased from last year, but violence against women is 
still increasing. Women complain of harassment on the street 
more than before. People comment on the way that women 
dress and the way that they walk. There is also violence against 
women prisoners. The government is not doing anything 
about this violence.” The activist’s observations concur with 
a 2008 survey by Women for Women International in which 
63.9 percent of the Iraqi women respondents “stated that 
violence against women in general was increasing.”
 The Iraq Family Health Survey of 2006–2007, conducted 
by a consortium including the World Health Organization and 
the Iraqi Ministry of Health, also questioned women about their 
violent encounters. The study found that, overall, 21.2 percent 
of women had experienced physical violence, with a markedly 
higher percentage (22.7) in the center and south than in the three 
northern provinces under the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(10.9). A total of 33.4 percent of women reported at least one form 
of emotional violence, ranging from insults to threats. The Iraqi 
penal code allows men to discipline their wives “within certain 
limits prescribed by Islamic law (shari‘a), by law or by custom,” 
meaning that men are almost never arrested or prosecuted for 
maltreatment of female relatives. Moreover, some women do not 
regard domestic abuse as a crime. According to Sundus Abbas, 
director of the Iraqi Women’s Leadership Institute in Baghdad, 
“Silence still marks all forms of domestic violence faced by women 
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and girls in Iraq, because this form of violence is justified by the 
misinterpretation of religious texts.”
While religion and culture are often cited as explanations 
for this phenomenon, and not only in Iraq, it is more useful 
to look at the role of socio-economic and political condi-
tions on the ground. Several women activists believe that 
male violence against female relatives is linked to high rates 
of unemployment and poverty among men, who carry the 
stress back to the household. Abbas quotes a statistic from 
the Ministry of Planning: 27 percent of Iraqis lived below the 
poverty line in 2010. Meanwhile, according to the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the unemploy-
ment rate for males aged 15–29 is 28 percent, compared to the 
national average of 18 percent.
Female unemployment is also a huge problem that has deep-
ened since 2003. The 2008 Women for Women International 
survey, which gathered responses from approximately 1,500 
women, found 45.3 percent describing their job opportunities 
as “poor” and 26.6 percent saying they had no opportunities at 
all. Widows and other female heads of household, who make 
up roughly 11 percent of all Iraqi households and many of 
whom have been displaced by conflict, are particularly vulner-
able to poverty linked to lack of employment. In February 
2009, the state minister for women’s affairs, Nawal al-Samarra’i, 
briefly resigned her post because of the insufficient resources 
allocated to her office to deal with Iraq’s 3 million widows. 
Although the government pays widows’ pensions of $60–100, 
depending on the number of children, as few as one quarter 
of women have been able to claim this money thanks to a 
complicated application process and the lack of capacity of 
government institutions.2
There are several reports suggesting that women in poverty 
are vulnerable to sexual exploitation. “The fragility of state 
institutions and the failure of the rule of law has created room 
for human trafficking gangs, especially for the trafficking of 
women and girls for sexual exploitation and prostitution,” 
said Abbas. Iraqi criminal gangs are involved in shipping 
women and girls to Syria, Jordan, Qatar and other Gulf 
countries to work as prostitutes. Most often, the women and 
girls are from poor families in search of employment. Human 
Rights Watch found that police officers are sometimes also 
implicated in the trafficking networks.3
Corruption and impunity within the security services is 
sadly widespread in today’s Iraq. As one woman, the founder 
of an Iraqi NGO assisting women in poverty, lamented, 
“Human rights violations are one of the most important 
lessons that Iraqi security forces have learned from the US and 
British militaries.” As early as 2004, it was revealed that US 
forces had arrested the wives, daughters and even mistresses 
of alleged insurgents or Baath Party members in order to 
gather intelligence and it has been reported that women 
prisoners were sexually abused and raped by US soldiers.4 
Iraqi women activists interviewed for this article spoke of 
women prisoners—arrested for suspected links to insurgents 
or for prostitution they may have been forced into—who are 
still subject to abuse in Iraqi police stations. Activists are not 
given access to the prisoners, but believe that authorities have 
done nothing to redress the problem. Such ill treatment fits 
into the larger picture of torture and abuse by Iraqi security 
forces, documented by Human Rights Watch and others, after 
those forces were granted sweeping powers to deal with the 
insurgency. Women abused in jail are particularly unlikely to 
report the crime, due to the stigma of rape and fear that their 
families may kill them for motives of “honor.”
Political developments have helped to normalize this 
violence. Conservative or misogynistic interpretations of 
religious texts have become pervasive as religious parties and 
tribal figures have come to power through elections, with 
the complicity of US occupation authorities. Public morality 
campaigns strongly encourage women to wear the correct 
“Islamic” clothing, through such instruments as posters 
illustrating the “proper” and “improper” forms of hijab, or 
modest attire. Militias, many of which are linked to parties 
in government, are involved in harassment of women on the 
streets and at checkpoints based on how they are dressed. 
These paramilitaries have also intimidated and even murdered 
professional women with impunity.
Sign at a Najaf rally reads, “Stop violence against women.”     ALAA AL-MARJANI/AP PHOTO
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But, increasingly, ordinary people on the street have also 
become agents of control and repression. One Baghdad-based 
academic and women’s rights activist put it this way: “As a 
woman these days, you feel under pressure to obey all the 
time. People make comments about what you wear and what 
you do when you are out and about. It is increasingly difficult 
to go out by yourself. A male family member always has to 
be with you if you want to go anywhere.” The regulation of 
Iraqi women’s bodies in the name of culture and identity is 
a crucial mechanism for the consolidation of the authority 
of the religious and tribal leaders dominating Iraq’s political 
institutions. In such an environment, many women stay at 
home and anxious parents are pulling their young girls out 
of school.
Iraqi Kurdistan
Iraqi Kurdistan poses a paradox. Overall, the region, 
comprising the governorates of Erbil, Suleimaniya and 
Dohuk, enjoys far greater security than southern and central 
Iraq. After years of struggling with punitively limited state 
provisions, whether in electricity, housing or employment, 
the infrastructure and economy of Kurdistan appear to be on 
the mend. Investors have pumped in some $14 billion since 
2005, and no visitor, particularly to Erbil, can fail to notice 
the changes to the urban landscape. Yet corruption, nepotism 
and political intimidation continue to plague the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG). Civil society organizations, 
including women’s rights organizations, have mushroomed 
since the early 1990s, when Baghdad withdrew its army from 
the Kurdish areas. But these groups also remain dependent 
on the good will of the main political parties, the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
The KRG is officially supportive of combating violence 
against women and has developed a strategy to counter it, 
working closely with politicians, women’s rights activists, 
academics and international experts, and often with interna-
tional funding. Nevertheless, the KRG encompasses an array 
of voices on gender issues, from secular-oriented, pro-women’s 
rights politicians with links to the Kurdish women’s move-
ment and international organizations to more conservative 
politicians with links to religious and tribal leaders. With 
the debates between these camps unresolved, the situation 
on the ground continues to be critical. The Iraq Family 
and Household Survey found that 61.6 percent of women 
in Kurdistan had experienced controlling behavior by their 
husbands, 17.6 percent had suffered from emotional violence 
and 10.9 percent have experienced some form of physical 
violence at the hands of an intimate partner. In particular, 
the phenomenon of so-called honor killings remains endemic. 
The case of Du‘a Khalil Aswad, who was stoned to death 
in the street by a group of men in April 2007 at Bashiqa, 
near Mosul, made headlines internationally. Aged 17 and a 
member of Iraq’s Yazidi religious minority, her offense in the 
eyes of the men in her family and community was that she 
had formed an attachment to a young Sunni Muslim man. 
Her murder was filmed by an onlooker on his cellular phone 
and then widely circulated on the Internet. In 2002, under 
pressure from activists, the KRG amended the penal code 
to remove the “honorable motives” clause in cases involving 
crimes against women. Since then, killings in the name of 
honor are reported much more widely, but many cases still 
go unremarked. Moreover, Kurdish women activists say that 
only a very few men have been prosecuted for killing their 
female relatives.
While the killings are certainly its most gruesome form, 
violence in the name of honor encompasses a broad spectrum 
of practices, from policing of attire and comportment to denial 
of education to maiming. Violence and repression within the 
family have resulted in a high rate of suicide among women, 
who frequently do not see another way out of their plight. 
A comprehensive, in-depth report on honor-based violence 
by a group of researchers questions the official designation 
of several deaths by immolation as “accidents.”5 Some of the 
cases so classified were actually suicides, but others counted as 
“suicides” were actually honor-motivated murders, according 
to several Kurdish women’s rights activists interviewed for 
this article.
There are also concerns among civil society groups about 
widespread female genital mutilation in northern Iraq. A 2009 
survey by the Iraqi Kurdistan Ministry of Human Rights 
suggests that in one district over 40 percent of women and 
girls aged 11–24 years have been subjected to such operations. 
A Human Rights Watch report surveying a wider geographical 
area gives even higher figures.6 Female genital mutilation can 
be a life-threatening procedure, particularly in places that have 
no emergency health care facilities, as in many rural parts of 
Iraqi Kurdistan. Some girls and young women have bled to 
death after being cut.
Despite the progress made by some sections of the govern-
ment, the media and women’s rights organizations, there are 
huge challenges ahead, particularly beyond the cities of Erbil, 
Suleimaniya and Dohuk, where the sway of tribal leaders 
often exceeds that of the KRG. A backlash can be detected in 
the more conservative tribal and Islamist quarters, including 
those within the KRG itself. In May 2008, the Suleimaniya-
based Asuda shelter for victims of domestic and honor-based 
violence came under attack with gunfire. Although disgruntled 
family members make most such threats, there is a vocal 
strand within Iraqi Kurdish society that objects to the notion 
of gender equality. According to Rudaw, a private English-
language newspaper published in Erbil, the KRG’s minister 
of religious endowments and affairs, Kamil Haji Ali, opposes 
a new law that will promote the concept. He and others are 
outraged by the law, which in their view will spread “immoral 
behavior” by “legitimizing homosexuality and illicit sexual 
relations.” Sozan Shihab, leader of the majority Kurdistani 
Alliance in the KRG’s legislature, challenges this interpretation, 
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arguing that the law merely aims to decrease social injustice 
against women in Iraqi Kurdistan: “The phrase ‘gender 
equality’ means social equality between men and women in 
terms of rights and duties,” she said. “Women and men are 
equal and have no differences.”7 Nevertheless, and aside from 
the problem of hostility to homosexuality, the conflation of 
gender equality with “illicit” (meaning extramarital) sex has 
often proven an effective tactic for discrediting the work of 
women’s rights activists all over the Middle East.
Little Remedy
In 2010, the Iraqi government, in partnership with the UN, 
participated in the global campaign called 16 Days of Activism 
to End Violence Against Women, which runs annually from 
November 25 to December 10. Under the slogan “Unite 
to End Violence Against Women in Iraq,” Iraq’s first such 
national effort aimed to increase awareness of gender-based 
violence among Iraqis and to highlight the positive role that 
can be played by Iraqi males, especially decision-makers and 
community leaders. According to Khuloud Sami, then state 
minister of women’s affairs, the “landmark campaign” would 
inaugurate a four-year national strategy culminating in a 
reformed family protection law.
Yet women’s rights activists complained that very little is 
being done at the official level in central and southern Iraq. 
Sundus Abbas argued, “We can see clearly a denial of this 
phenomenon [of violence against women]. The government 
considers any discussion of it as an attempt to ‘harm’ the 
society.” One might even contend that the Iraqi government 
is contributing to the increase in violence against women by 
failing to crack down on armed militias, criminal gangs and 
Islamist groups who have been targeting women systematically. 
Neither is the government acting to curb domestic violence, 
which is rarely prosecuted through the legal system. Iraqi 
NGOs in several governorates have tried to address this 
problem by providing legal aid, family mediation and medical 
services to women who are victims of violence. Women’s 
shelters do not exist in south and central Iraq. Women subject 
to domestic violence are left with little remedy but mediation, 
which will often encourage them to return to the family home.
For several years, the No Violence network, made up of 
NGOs and women’s rights activists, has mounted its own 
campaign called Stop Violence Against Women, built on a wider 
non-violence and democratization platform. These groups face 
an uphill battle, however. Many government officials deny the 
existence of violence against women and fellow civil society 
activists do not see the issue as a priority—and can even be 
hostile to raising it. One woman who is active through her 
Continued on page 48.
Sirwa Hama Amin, 27, was shot in an “honor” attack by her family members that left her husband dead. AYMAN OGHANNA
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EDITOR’S PICKS
NGO in assisting women in poverty 
objected to a question about violence 
against women, saying, “Some ‘rented’ 
NGOs focus on ‘violence against women,’ 
and they mention a few cases as if this is 
the biggest source of suffering for Iraqi 
women…. This distracts public opinion 
from the real violence and problems.” 
Among these sources of suffering, she 
cited corruption, poverty, food insecurity, 
poor health and education services, and 
human rights violations—all of which 
afflict Iraqi women and men equally. Yet 
research shows that, while the humani-
tarian catastrophe in post-invasion Iraq 
has been indiscriminate, women have 
been hurt in ways that men have not.
Averted Eyes
Between 2003 and 2008, amidst talk of 
a “new Iraq,” the Bush administration 
and international NGOs were eager to 
place Iraqi women at center stage. It now 
appears, however, that Iraqi women’s 
rights has dropped off the Western 
agenda altogether. While a number of 
international NGOs continue to work 
in Iraq, and a few have programs aimed 
at combating violence against women, 
overall assistance for the Iraqi popula-
tion has decreased dramatically since 
2008. Moreover, according to an OECD 
report, only 5 percent of aid allocated 
to Iraq in 2008 (excluding the United 
States) was earmarked for gender equality 
programming.8 In early 2011, the website 
of the State Department’s Office of 
Global Women’s Affairs contained scant 
mention of women in Iraq compared 
to the days of the Bush administration. 
While the State Department granted $5 
million to NGOs in 2010 to “provide 
direct support and training to Iraqi 
widows, female heads of household and 
other vulnerable women in Iraq in the 
areas of literacy, entrepreneurship and 
vocational skills,” there is no attention 
given to the issue of violence against 
women in Iraq, despite the fact that 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 
International Fund for Women project 
lists combating violence against women 
as one of its goals.
The hyper-visibility of Iraqi women 
in the early years of the US-led occupa-
tion applied a progressive gloss to the 
destruction wrought by the occupation 
authorities and their Iraqi political allies. 
Today, the invisibility of Iraqi women in 
the Obama administration’s discourse, 
eight years after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein, operates to conceal the utter 
failure of the US project in Iraq.
Most Iraqi women activists agree that 
violence against women in Iraq has risen 
noticeably since 2003. Yet the increase is 
little known, much less the scandal that it 
should be, because so many of the victims 
and their families keep mum out of 
fear. Meanwhile, US officials avert their 
eyes. Iraqi authorities deny the problem 
and accuse those who raise the issue of 
“dishonoring” Iraq. The failure of the US 
and its Iraqi allies to address the phenom-
enon of violence against women is not 
surprising, for it is linked to the deteriora-
tion of the Iraqi economy, the corruption 
of national institutions, the lack of social 
services and the rise of ethno-religious 
political leaders that have accompanied 
the sanctions, war and civil strife that 
the US and its proxies have inflicted 
upon the country. Combating violence 
against women in Iraq means combating 
its structural causes.                           ■
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